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Abstract

Terrorism is a phenomenon that baffles even the most experienced of researchers within
academia. Understanding what constitutes terrorism is important to the field of
international relations because combatting terrorist violence yields no straightforward
method of prevention and protection. This paper examines four measures of
counterterrorism taken by the U.S. government after the September 11th attacks. The
methods included in this study and the framework in which they are congruent with are:
The War on Terror as a defense strategy, torture and “enhanced interrogation techniques”
as a deterrence method, targeted drone attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan as a
compellence force, and public diplomacy as a feature of negotiation. This paper examines
which methods, if any, were successful as counterterrorism measures by whether they
could neutralize al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden without contributing to recruitment and
further organized attacks against the West.
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Introduction
Terrorism is a phenomenon that baffles even the most experienced of researchers
within academia. Understanding what constitutes terrorism is important to the field of
international relations because combatting global violence in the name of political
ideology yields no straightforward method of prevention and protection. One of the
biggest challenges of terrorism studies includes the lack of a cohesive definition of the
phenomenon, as well as the contextual notion of terrorism changing through historical
circumstance. Regardless, most scholars agree that the function of contemporary
terrorism is to achieve maximum impact through extreme violence and coercion. While
terrorism is not a political ideology nor an end goal, it is a powerful tool intended to bring
political change. Further, scholars contend that terrorism is primarily a tool of non-state
actors that are difficult to control, which does not allow an easily recognized method of
predicting when an attack is to occur.
When addressing terrorist organizations and examining methods to prevent and
counter violent acts, states are generally faced with a few options. Coined by Thomas
Schelling, compellence involves the ability of one state to coerce another state into
action, usually by threatening punishment.1 Its opposite, deterrence, is a strategy
intended to dissuade an adversary from taking an action not yet started, or to prevent
them from doing something that another state desires.2 Meanwhile, measures of defense
include a direct reaction to attacks and instigation with the use of counter force. Finally,
international negotiation is often a process of power-based dialogue intended to achieve

1

Petersen, W. J. (1986). Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom. International Studies
Quarterly, 30(3), Page 269.
2 Petersen, W. J. (1986). Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom. International Studies
Quarterly, 30(3), Page 270.
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certain goals or ends, and which may or may not thoroughly resolve a dispute or disputes
to the satisfaction of all parties.3 Luckily, the period of post 9/11 counterterrorism
measures was so varied that we can examine at least one measure which ostensibly falls
under each category, and will do so later in this paper.
In this study, I will attempt to answer the following: How do states combat
incidences of international terrorism proliferated by non-state actors such as Al Qaeda
and ISIS? What methods are the most effective for states at stopping further terrorist
attacks? In answering these questions, I will examine the post 9/11 policy period in the
United States and specifically four main methods used in direct response to the attacks of
September 11th which fall under each of the four options in which states are presented in
response to terrorist action: deterrence, compellence, defense and negotiation. These
methods include: 1.) targeted drone attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan (compellence)
2.) United States and United Kingdom’s military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan during
the War on Terror (defense) 3.) torture of captured combatants (deterrence) 4.) public
diplomacy and intercultural relations (negotiation). Upon discussion of these four key
methods, I will determine which of these methods, if any, has been most effectual in
states’ abilities to address and defeat international terrorism by non-state actors and why.
The post 9/11 policy period is a key timeframe, as much of the literature on the subject
focuses on the reactionary policies, and because 9/11 changed the nature of how we view
terrorism today.
For this paper, I suggest that the success of a counterterrorism method is
measured by not producing a result of unintended consequences and negative side effects
3

Müller, H. (2004). Arguing, Bargaining and all that: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and the Logic of Appropriateness in
International Relations. European Journal of International Relations, 10(3), Page 406.
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that could undermine the intended purpose of the method itself. In the post 9/11 sphere,
this includes measures which do not contribute to the recruitment and radicalization of
new terrorists. For example, targeted drone strikes of key Al Qaeda figures by the Obama
administration in Pakistan and Yemen resulted in strengthening the solidarity in the
support environment of the targeted individuals, resulting in further civilian casualties.4
Within these communities, these drone strikes united them in their shared hatred of the
West and served as a catalyst for further radicalization.5 In examining these methods, I
claim that their success in combatting terrorism is determined by their ability to defeat the
intended individual or group responsible for a terrorist act with a targeted method that
does not result in civilian casualties or the violation of civilian human rights, and cannot
be used as a tool for further recruitment by the communities that they effect. Another
measure for success that will be considered throughout this paper is the ability of each
method to neutralize the threat of the organizations. This can expand to any method
which severely hindered the ability of terrorist organizations to continue large scale
attacks, acquire new territory, and increase recruitment.
This paper will first discuss the working definitions of “terrorism” that are used in
the political sphere and are referenced by academics. Chapter 2 will examine the four
aforementioned methods used to combat terrorism in the post 9/11 period using the
following mechanisms: compellence, defense, deterrence, and negotiation. Chapter 3 will
continue with an examination of the War on Terror as a defense policy. Chapter 4 will
discuss torture and “enhanced interrogation” as deterrence policy. Chapter 5 will engage

Khan, A. N. (2011). The US’ Policy of Targeted Killings by Drones in Pakistan. IPRI Journal 9(1), Page 22.
O'Connell, M. (2010). Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004–2009. Shooting to Kill: Socio-Legal
Perspectives on the Use of Lethal Force, Notre Dame Law School, 09(43), Page 26.
4
5
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targeted drone attacks as compellence policy, while Chapter 6 will conclude with public
diplomacy as negotiation.
I intend to discuss these findings and illustrate some of the theoretical, practical,
and empirical challenges that require further and careful attention. I will address the
residual impact these responses had on the communities they effected, as well as what
evidence was presented for their justification. Last, I hope to provide recommendations
for the future of combatting terrorism, including re-examining its current definition and
suggesting alternative methods for study in the field of terrorism prevention; with
realistic alternatives that include allying with the Muslim community and reforming
policy that properly addresses domestic threats. I intend to use this data to determine that
the degree which these policies was not only ineffective in bringing convictions and
deterring future attacks, but further fueled a divide between Muslims in the United and
were used as recruiting tools for extremism.
Although the media and government often consider terrorists as irrational actors
who are incapable of being deterred, under this framework I will consider non-state
actors who engage in terrorist acts, such as al Qaeda and ISIS as rational actors with
rational intent and strong motivations. I will do this because the state’s approach to
counter-terrorism continues to exhibit intent to deter terrorist organizations and terrorists,
a method that assumes the rationality of actors. Some of these approaches will be
addressed in the later part of this paper. Further, even the most motivated and prepared
individual or group intending to carry out this mass violence will choose the option of
minimal risk of intervention, allowing for the assumption of rationality.

7

While most of these strategies may yield short-term benefits, such policies have
proven unable to remedy the issue of terrorism in the longer term. This is particularly
relevant to the counterterror methods used in response to 9/11. Given the research on
terrorism available and the methods used for this study on what is effective in defeating
it, I propose that public diplomacy, states’ use of soft power, and cooperation with the
Muslim community is the most effective and long-term solution to combatting
international terrorism. Additionally, I intend to show that this measure is the only
method out of the four I shall examine that does not result in hostility or be used as a
successful terrorist recruitment tool.

Literature Review
Scholars and policy makers alike remain polarized on how to best address acts of
terrorism. This is not surprising given that the very definition of terrorism is not a
generally agreed upon concept. Bruce Hoffman details the importance of defining
terrorism in a political context to distinguish it from other types of violence and crime, as
well as emphasizing the threat of the violence itself. Hoffman suggests a broad enough
definition to include all types of political violence- a concept that scholars disagree with
as they contend to zero in on a specific definition.6 Additionally, Hoffman distinguishes
that those who are labeled as terrorists very rarely see themselves as such.7 This offers a
unique perspective as scholars do not typically consider the mindset of those committing
the violence. Further, Hodgson and Tadros consider fair labeling of the word terrorism,
and state the importance of the law to distinguish between legitimate freedom fighters
6

Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hoff12698.
Page 5
7
Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hoff12698.
Page 19
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combatting autocratic regimes and terrorists who hope to create chaos through violence.8
Lanier Burns suggests a definition that focuses on the semantics of the words used and
includes the propaganda surrounding the use of terror rather than just a broad conception
of political violence.9
In studying the War on Terror, Byman and Pollock believe that the War on Terror
posed a greater threat to national security than anything that preceded it. Byman and
Pollock argued that a withdrawal of troops without the establishment of a governing
system and without instituting community-based systems of support would further
radicalize the local population.10 They argue that military presence created a flourishing
of terrorist activity rather than quelling it because forces were occupational and not
designed to strengthen the Iraqi community. The authors call for a bolstering of Iraqi
democratic systems, and support for the surrounding areas as they experience an influx of
refugees who are vulnerable to radicalization.11
Ty Solomon argues that the Bush administration’s normalization of the invasion
and occupation of Iraq as the correct response to the 9/11 attacks reconstructed public
opinion on the efficacy of the war in avenging the attacks and preventing future violence.
Solomon claims the War on Terror after 9/11 became a social background through which
a variety of threats could be reconstructed, whether those threats came from non-state
terrorist groups or Iraq.12 The author states the restructuring of the concepts of American

8

Hodgson, J. S. and Tadros V. (2013). The Impossibility of Defining Terrorism. New Criminal Law Review 16(3), Page 525
Burns, L. (2011). Toward a Contemporary Definition of Terrorism. Forum on Public Policy: A Journal of the Oxford Round Table,
2011(3), Page 23.
10 Byman, D. L. and Pollock, K. M. (2008). Iraq’s Long-Term Impact on Jihadist Terrorism. The Annals of the American Academy.
618, Page 55.
11 Byman, D. L. and Pollock, K. M. (2008). Iraq’s Long-Term Impact on Jihadist Terrorism. The Annals of the American Academy.
618, Page 67.
12 Solomon, T. (2009). Social Logics and Normalization in the War on Terror. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 38(2),
Page 271.
9
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“freedom” being under attack by a foreign enemy created a narrative of defense which
continues to affect the discursive dynamics after 9/11 still today.13
The use of torture and excessive force was at the forefront in the post 9/11 period
as the United States used the attacks to justify torture of combatants at U.S. bases. In
many cases, “excessive force” and “torture” is subjective as the international community
struggles to find a universal definition and the United States continues to manipulate
loopholes in international torture laws.14 Jamal Barnes states that the semantics of the
redefinition of torture to “enhanced interrogation techniques” after 9/11 changed the
nature of the Western perception of torture and its justifications.15 He argues that this
redefinition of torture removed its negative connotations and deemed it as necessary to
the defense of freedom.16
John W. Schiemann details how there is little consensus among governments and
policy makers on whether interrogational torture is effective or not. Additionally, he
states that torture will always operate at a level that does not decrease in intensity or
frequency, given that if the detainee gives up information, the interrogator knows what
works, and if the detainee fails to divulge, the force will increase.17 This shows a
frightening standard, and makes the necessity of condemnation by governments
imperative.
Avery Gordon offers a sobering critique of torture in Abu Ghraib, stating that a
long history of prison abuse and excessive force by the U.S. military created a torture
culture. Gordon states the normalization of prisoner abuse in the prison system evolved
13

Solomon, T. (2009). Social Logics and Normalization in the War on Terror. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 38(2),
Page 278.
14
Alvarez, J.A. Torturing the Law. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law. 37(2). 175-223.
15
Barnes, J. (2015). The ‘War on Terror’ and the Battle for the Definition of Torture. International Relations, 30(1), Page 102.
16
Barnes, J. (2015). The ‘War on Terror’ and the Battle for the Definition of Torture. International Relations, 30(1), Page 105.
17
Schiemann, J. W. (2012). Interrogational Torture. Political Research Quarterly, 65(1), Page 15.
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into normalization of combatants after 9/11, and were simply an extension of this violent
culture.18 Gordon states that the images of abuse released from Abu Ghraib closely
mirrored those documenting the American prison system, and that it was no wonder that
these methods were deemed as acceptable guard behavior and that nobody was held
responsible.19
Though accurate data of the number of civilian casualties of drones remains
elusive, scholars contend that drone attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan had a profound
effect on the nature of counterterrorism. While many policymakers defend their use
because of drone assistance in capturing and assassinating bin Laden and eliminating key
ISIS figureheads, drone casualties remain high even as their technology evolves. Akbar
Nasir Khan argues that the tactical move of using the drones is counterproductive and
unwittingly helping terrorists in their recruitment process which resulted in the
continuance of the cycle of violence, killing more civilians than the terrorists who were
intended targets.20 Khan claims drones are also a product of norm socialization in the
War on Terror, despite the evidence stating their ineffectiveness, as they pose an easy
method of inflicting violence on an enemy with little human effort and minimal cost.
Khan advocates for closer examination of the legality of the use of drones, as the
unintended consequences of further radicalization far outweigh the benefits of their
potential use.21
Mary O’Connell claims that the U.S. use of combat drones in Afghanistan
between 2004 and 2009 appears to fall far short of meeting the international law rules

18

Gordon, A. F. (2006). Abu Ghraib: Imprisonment and the War on Terror. Race & Class, 48(1), Page 48.
Gordon, A. F. (2006). Abu Ghraib: Imprisonment and the War on Terror. Race & Class, 48(1), Page 49.
Khan, A. N. (2011). The US’ Policy of Targeted Killings by Drones in Pakistan. IPRI Journal 9(1), Page 22.
21 Khan, A. N. (2011). The US’ Policy of Targeted Killings by Drones in Pakistan. IPRI Journal 9(1), Page 38.
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toward armed force and the conduct of armed force using military technology. Further,
O’Connell claims that the Pakistani authority never consented to the use of drones, and
that the CIA operatives controlling the drone attacks are not lawful combatants with the
privilege to kill during an armed conflict. O’Connell argues that drone use is unlawful
because CIA operatives are not trained in the use of force and that drones kill many
unintended victims for each intended one, raising questions of proportionality- making
them virtually ineffective in quelling terrorist attacks.22
In the period following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government severely
underutilized its soft power and diplomatic weight. Peter Van Ham argues that following
9/11, the Bush administration set in motion a flurry of initiatives aimed at rebranding the
USA as a compassionate hegemon rather than a global bully with the argument that
ordinary people have greatly distorted, but carefully cultivated images of the USA to
dispel the images of hostility that breed extremism.23 Van Ham argues that public
diplomacy is important as a long term resolution to terrorism and creates a more
sophisticated approach in American security policy more than forceful methods of
tackling terrorism. Further, Van Ham argues for diplomacy as the main component to
restoring U.S. credibility in the international community.24
As evidenced, the information collected on the study of terrorism and the scope of
the methods used to defeat it remain as broad as they are varied. For the duration of this
paper, I will examine this literature and its concepts on a micro level, and conclude the
areas for further study that are necessary to address the convoluted issue of international
22

O'Connell, M. (2010). Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004–2009. Shooting to Kill: Socio-Legal
Perspectives on the Use of Lethal Force, Notre Dame Law School, 09(43), Page 26.
23
Ham, P. V. (2003). War, Lies, and Videotape: Public Diplomacy and the USA’s War on Terrorism. Security Dialogue, 34(4), Page
428.
24
Ham, P. V. (2003). War, Lies, and Videotape: Public Diplomacy and the USA’s War on Terrorism. Security Dialogue, 34(4), Page
442.

12

terrorism.

Research Design
As the phenomenon of terrorism evolves into our modern understanding, the
intricacies of each factor involved in the foundation and motivation of terrorist groups
continues to prove chaotic for scholars and academics. The factors that contribute to
terrorist ideology along with the factors that make an individual susceptible to
recruitment and violent action are convoluted and stretch outside the realms of this paper.
Still, these factors remain crucial to the strategy of preventing future violence and
combatting terrorist activity. Unfortunate for scholars and policy makers, the chaos of
terrorist groups and the individuals who sympathize with their ideology serve to be
complicated for many reasons. First, the lack of centralized and monitored location of
training camps and terrorist cells make pinpointing them difficult. Although it was known
that al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden operated out of Afghanistan, military presence in the
region failed to capture him or other high ranked officials within the organization. More
recently, as ISIS insurgents take land by force and demand sovereignty, sympathizers of
the organization from outside the region are encouraged to administer lone wolf attacks,
making external cell locations difficult to identify.
Rationale along with purpose of outcome varies among terrorist groups. What one
terrorist organization seeks to accomplish with violent methods may not be the same
motivation for action as another organization. For example, French revolutionaries
employed violent attacks for freedom from aristocratic rule. The Irish Republican Army
(IRA) sought the establishment of a republic, the end of British rule in Northern Ireland,

13

and the reunification of Ireland. Similarly, the Palestinian Liberation Organization used
armed struggle to establish a similar sense of sovereignty. ISIS and al Qaeda hoped to
determine a caliphate and impose Islamic law in the areas they control, eventually
spreading to the rest Muslim world while raising anti-American sentiment and bleeding
the United States of powerful resources through provoked attacks. Organizational goals
vary from liberation of occupation to hostile sentiment, and are not readily quantifiable.
Because of the sporadic nature of these terrorist groups, this paper is relegated
only to the information that is available. While the field of terrorism studies hosts a
breadth of knowledge, much of the key intelligence regarding al Qaeda and other Islamic
extremist cells is not accessible to the public and to scholars alike. For example,
determining whether key intelligence was released during the torture of captured
combatants at U.S. bases in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Cuba is regulated by the released CIA
report. The sensitivity of the information disclosed is dictated by the administration’s
desire to release as much or as little to the public as they want. Due to this restriction of
information, terrorism studies are limited in the statistics available to measuring the
efficacy of counterterrorism strategy. Further, terrorist radicalization has multiple social
and cultural factors which can not be explicitly quantitatively linked to any specific
counterterrorism strategy. Despite these limits, much of the field has valuable qualitative
studies which provide key insight into the outcomes of these counterterrorism strategies
and the implications for further conflict. This paper will examine qualitative studies of
the variety of counterterror strategies in response to the 9/11 attacks including U.S.
military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan during the War on Terror, the use of enhanced

14

interrogation techniques, targeted drone strikes and the dissemination of propaganda and
use of soft power to exert American influence in the Middle East.
For the purpose of examining counterterrorism strategy, the attacks of September
11th serve as a strong case study. The attack on the Twin Towers, Pentagon, and downed
plane in Pennsylvania killed 3,000 people and was the largest terrorist attack on
American soil. The event propelled American security to the forefront of the international
stage, placed al Qaeda as a strong adversary and launched a global campaign to defend
American values. Because of such a large-scale attack, the United States employed largescale responses that had domestic and international implications. The strategies employed
in response to the attack spanned over almost 20 years, two different 8-year presidencies,
and continues today. Both the Bush and Obama administration deployed a variety of
techniques to administer justice for 9/11, suppress radicalization against the West, deplete
terrorist organizations, and prevent future attacks. The administrations explored military
presence, surveillance of citizens, travel restrictions, targeted drone attacks, military
presence, and torture and excessive force to name a few. The variety and severity of each
method created a huge financial burden, redefined American presence and relations with
the Middle East, and drew sharp criticism from the international community.
American security policy after the 9/11 attacks had a profound effect on the
international realm and the reputation of the United States. After the attacks, international
focus turned to the history between the United States and Iraq for the occupation,
Afghanistan for harboring al Qaeda fugitives, and Saudi Arabia as the origin of Osama
bin Laden. Further, as a strong international ally, the United Kingdom supported U.S.
forces in the War on Terror and distributed a small number of troops while conducting

15

their own surveillance on British citizens back home, as tensions among the British
Muslim population rose. The destabilization of Iraq after Obama withdrew troops
allowed extremism to take advantage of the vulnerability of the region, as ISIS
capitalized on existing sectarian conflict, damages incurred and absence of government,
and the neighboring civil war in Syria to continue the mission for an Islamic caliphate
and encouraged more violent attacks on the West.
In the years following the September 11th attacks, radicalization and recruitment
experienced an upsurge in Europe, the United States and Africa, with extremist
sympathizers traveling to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria to join insurgents against the West.
Islamic extremists encouraged follow up attacks in Brussels, Paris, New York, London
and San Bernadino to name a few. Terrorist organizations used counterterror methods
such as the War on Terror and torture in Guantanamo Bay for justification of these
attacks. Indeed the 9/11 attacks themselves had a profound effect on American security,
but the response of the United States and measures employed changed the course of
history and contributed to the growth of terrorist activity across the globe. For these
reasons, studying security measures and administration response to the September 11th
attacks is a key feature of international relations and international terrorism studies, as the
subject is convoluted and has several state and non-state actors. Scholars who embark
upon sorting through the tricky subject of international terrorism have no shortage of
information, and theory at their disposal.
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Chapter 1: The Challenge of Defining Terrorism
One of the most monumental challenges for scholars in understanding terrorism is
the lack of a clear and cohesive definition of the phenomenon. This is a challenge that is
not only prevalent in the academic world, but has serious political and social
consequences as states struggle to understand it. Even today, UN member states still
don’t really have a working and agreed upon definition25. Generally, dictionaries define
terrorism as an unlawful, violent act or threat against people or property to intimidate or
coerce an enemy for political or ideological reasons26. Still, even though we are often
secure in our knowledge that a terrorist attack has been committed when we see it, a
credible definition of terrorism eludes scholars and governments alike27.
According to scholars and historians, the term “terrorist” dates back to the French
Revolution, and was popularized as a revolutionary and anti-government act by non-state
or subnational actors 28. The term had a positive connotation and was linked to the ideals
of democracy, as revolutionaries used extreme measures to fight oppressive
establishment forces. By the late 19th century, Irish revolutionary campaigns such as the
Irish Republican Brotherhood utilized bombings against British rule, inciting chaos and
adopting the title of terrorists. The term was appropriated again in the early 1930’s to
describe the rise of dictatorial regimes in Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Stalinist
Russia29. After WWII, the term shifted back to include antigovernment and revolutionary
groups, particularly against former colonial powers. These freedom fighters, however,
25

Burns, Lanier (2011). Toward a Contemporary Definition of Terrorism. Forum on Public Policy: A Journal of the Oxford Round
Table, 2011(3). page 2.
26
Burns, Lanier (2011). Toward a Contemporary Definition of Terrorism. Forum on Public Policy: A Journal of the Oxford Round
Table, 2011(3). page 11.
27
Hodgson, J., & Tadros, V. (2013). The Impossibility of Defining Terrorism. New Criminal Law Review: An International and
Interdisciplinary Journal, 16(3), 500.
28
Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hoff12698.
Page 3.
29
Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hoff12698.
Page 14.
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argued that oppressed parties who fought against colonial rule should not be labeled with
the lexicon of terrorist; and adapted names with words like “freedom” and “liberation”,
such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization30. Many of these former colonies owe
their independence to the freedom fighting independence groups who utilized violence
against the state.
By the 1980’s the term was redefined toward calculated means to destabilize the
West, as suicide bombings in the Middle East against American targets came to dominate
the definition and served as a root to the definition we know today. By the 1990’s,
terrorism came to denote threats against nation states by non-state actors and nongovernmental processes and organizations. The concept of terrorism transformed in the
public and political sphere from being about individual phenomenon to involving
irregular forces in a multifaceted war. This led to the attacks of September 11th, which
redefined terrorist attacks on a grander scale and marked the advent of modern,
international terrorism by political groups under the guise of Islam 31.
According to theorist Bruce Hoffman, terrorism is “violence – or equally
important, the threat of violence- used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a
political aim.”32 Hoffman states that definition is broad enough to include anything that
scares or “terrorizes” the general population by anyone who attempts to further his
political views by coercive intimidation33. Hoffman suggests that defining terrorism in a
political context is important to distinguish it from other types of violence and crime.

30

Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hoff12698.
Page 26.
31 Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hoff12698.
Page 27.
32 Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hoff12698.
Page 3.
33 Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hoff12698.
Page 2.
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Terrorism is an organized and intentional means of violence and extreme measures to
further a political belief- a particularly unique system. The nature of this distinction lies
in the fact that the threat of violence or actual violence is planned, calculated and
systematic34. Further, he attests that the defining characteristic of terrorism is the violent
act itself rather than the justification behind it or the identity of the perpetrators35. Still,
this distinction of violence is not made between state and non-state actors, forging a
confusing chasm in the potential definition of terrorism.
In addition to the historical fluidity of the term, finding a cohesive definition for
terrorism continues to be monumental as the actors involved do not self-identify with the
label. Hoffman claims that self-denial distinguishes terrorists from other politically
identifying groups. This is distinct from other revolutionary and anti-establishment
groups, as they seek to develop a core identity to convey their political goals and recruit
for their cause. Those who are the subject of the violence view it as terrorism, while those
who aren’t are more sympathetic36. These sympathetic parties will seek explanation as to
how the victims provoked the attackers to take violent action. This lack of selfidentification with the word terrorist makes it difficult for scholars and political actors to
create a general profile of who a terrorist is and what their specific aims are- allowing for
the definition to remain flexible over various historical periods.
Martha Crenshaw suggests that efficacy is the primary standard by which
terrorism is compared to other methods of achieving political goals37. Often it is in

34
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examining the level of damage and terror inflicted that efficacy is measured. The strategy
of terrorism has always been to bring about political change using violent and shocking
means, however the strategy has changed over time to adopt new outcomes. This change
in strategy and outcome makes a clear definition seem impossible. Terrorism may be a
reasonable and calculated response to a specific set of circumstances- a subject worthy of
further study in its entirety. Crenshaw does not believe terrorism should be treated as
irrational, a notion that I argue in this paper, and that terrorism is often used when
following the failure of other methods and a constraint of viable options38.
Crenshaw claims that after the attacks of September 11th, President Bush’s liberal
use of the word terror encompassed the emotional state of being scared or terrified rather
than the specific political phenomenon of terrorism, a sentiment which has only grown
exponentially in today’s socio-political sphere39. The word became synonymous with
anything that Americans irrationally feared, which for this political period is exclusively
Islamic extremism. The use of the word “terror” put forth by President Bush was such an
abstract entity that Americans needed an adversary to embody what that meant- opening
an opportunity for the use of various techniques to try to defeat it. Thus, The War on
Terror served as a reaction to the security threats facing the nation and accounts for the
way terrorism was defined in the early 20th century40.
Lanier Burns suggests using the semantics surrounding the word terrorism to
create a working definition of the term. Although the Oxford definition of terrorism
includes “government by intimidation”, a terrorist is someone who attempts to further his
38
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views by a system of coercive intimidation. Burns criticizes the current definitions of
terrorism by claiming the working definition should involve non- contemporary
incidents, as it is only an immediate assessment to look at modern examples of how we
understand terrorism today.41 Burns continues that the problem of identifying a definition
is the minefield of semantic equivalences that blend terrorism with various kinds of
extreme violence such as war, massacres, insurgency, riots and criminal activity. These
equivalences lack semantic clarity, according to Burns.42
Burns argues a comprehensive and interdisciplinary definition of terrorism is
simply not possible. He continues by suggesting that a working definition should include
propaganda of the deed, rather than political violence because including violent acts
alone is too large and too broad of a conceptual idea. He claims that the threat of
terrorism should not be included, nor should it be equated with a state of hostility.43 This
lack of definition and understanding of the circumstances that cause it make it difficult to
address it, hence why the US has tried many methods.
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Chapter 2: Overview of the Four Discussed Options in Response to Terrorism
With roots in the Cold War threat of nuclear attack, deterrence became the central
recourse for sustaining international and internal security and stability among and within
states in an era of serious conflict. After the attacks of September 11th, this framework
was utilized in the attempt to understand and conceptualize the cause of such a largescale attack, as well as the prevention of future attacks. As a result, deterrence theory
with respect to terrorism is a relatively new study, with research dating back to only the
last couple of decades— particularly as a solid definition of terrorism is still elusive.
In international relations, deterrence is a strategy with the intent to dissuade an
adversary from taking an action they have not yet started, or to prevent them from doing
something that threatens the state44. This theory is crucial because unpacking terrorism
allows us to think about deterring all levels of its actors including militant leaders,
religious ideologues, financiers, recruiters, bomb-makers, foot soldiers, suicide bombers,
and state, societal, and community supporters45. As each actor in terrorist organizations
operates on a multilevel scale, measures of deterrence differ based on their motivation
and intent. Deterrence is a difficult measure to use against terrorist groups, as each group
is usually scattered in location and shares a broad ideology. What works as deterring one
organization may not be a universal method against all organizations, particularly as nonstate actors. Further, states need both capability and the credibility to administer
punishment for deterrence to be a viable option.
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Regarding compellence, four clusters of factors all intertwined are especially
worthy of consideration: who is to be compelled, how important U.S. stakes are, what
threats or inducements are relevant, and who is doing the compelling. In all cases
considered, the United States had or could assemble overwhelming force. The question
then became whether that force could be credibly applied to the American purpose, even
as a threat.46 Diplomatic initiatives in compelling non-state actors face challenges
because the real leaders of the organization cannot easily be identified, or because those
who can be identified do not have the power to control their forces. Military force is also
problematic because terrorists are often dispersed, with no large and obvious targets.47
Additionally, compelling a target is more difficult than deterring one, because if the
target has committed to an action in front of its people, backing down entails at least a
loss of face and a risk that not many terrorists want to take.48
Finally, compelling requires targeting the adversary’s mind and identifying their
goals to manipulate them. The proximate targets of compellent campaigns are states or
groups, but the ultimate targets are individuals, i.e., leaders able to decide. This is
difficult with terrorist organizations who often change leadership and whose individuals’
statuses continually change. The ambiguous cases are so for just that reason: who is in
charge, and how completely is unclear. The challenge is to get inside the adversary’s
head, to threaten or hold at risk what he or she cares most about. This goal holds true for
all war, perhaps all foreign policy, but it holds especially true when the United States
seeks to prevail without using force and without necessarily defeating the adversary in
46
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the military sense.49 In the case of terrorism, this proves difficult as motivations vary
between sovereignty, political power and governmental control, decline of
Westernization and colonialism, etc.; and when faced with an adversary who defaults to
force.
Whether states can use force against terrorists based in another country is much
discussed. Some scholars and government officials believe the right to take military
action on the territory of another state is at the core of defense policy and why it is of
concern to international society. O’Connell states that governments have decided they
cannot eliminate the right to use force in self-defense in all cases but they have, through
international law, limited force in self-defense to the most exigent circumstancesincluding terrorist attacks. Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter prohibit the
unauthorized use of force except in self-defense against an armed attack, and even then
only until the Security Council acts. The charter clearly licenses at least one kind of resort
to force by an individual member state: namely, the use of armed force to repel an armed
attack.50
O’Connell continues to argue that armed force in self-defense must have defense
as its object. Force in self-defense must aim at stopping an attack in progress, defending
against a future attack once an attack has occurred, or ending an unlawful occupation.
Lawful self-defense is not meant to be a mere act of punishment or revenge. Armed force
to send a message or to generally deter is unlawful by definition of the United Nations
and not a good function of democracy. Further, armed counterattack must have the aim of
more specific defense and not just a use of retaliating force against an enemy. Where a
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significant armed attack has already occurred but is not on-going, the defending state
must show at least by clear and convincing evidence that future attacks are planned. In
the case where no actual attack has yet struck its intended target, the defending state may
act only where it has clear and convincing evidence of an incipient attack— one that is
underway, requiring an instant response.51
The argument against negotiation with terrorists is straightforward: Democracies
must never give in to violence, and terrorists must never be rewarded for using it52.
Officials argue that negotiations give legitimacy to terrorists and their methods while
undermining actors who have pursued political change through peaceful means. Informal
talks with terrorist organizations can destabilize the negotiating governments' political
systems, undercut international efforts to outlaw terrorism, and set a dangerous precedent.
When it comes to negotiating with terrorists, there is a clear disconnect between what
governments profess and what they do.53
The key objective for any government contemplating negotiations with terrorists
is not simply to end violence but to do so in a way that minimizes the risk of setting
dangerous precedents and destabilizing its political system. Additionally, the distinction
between supposedly rational terrorists and irrational ones is often in the eye of the
beholder. This is then left up to governments to decide the legitimacy of a terrorist
organization and whether they are worth negotiating with. Further, governments will
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inevitably encounter tremendous difficulties in constructing an inclusive negotiations
process.54
Although terrorists tend to portray themselves as belonging to tightly knit
organizations, the secret conditions under which they operate make it nearly impossible
for them to maintain a perfect chain of command, making negotiation with a central
leadership figure virtually impossible to administer. In terrorist networks such as al
Qaeda and Islamic State, the leadership hardly plays any operational role at all, merely
providing ideological inspiration and moral sanction to its associated networks, and often
acts a symbolic figurehead than a functional means of leadership. Governments eager for
progress may be too quick to jump at any sign of a strategic juncture. This impulse may
be well intentioned, but it can turn out to be counterproductive.55
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Chapter 3: The War on Terror
Following the attacks, the Bush administration strongly pushed the agenda that the
Iraq invasion was the correct defensive response to the attacks, as Saddam’s regime
posed a threat to American “freedom”. Faced with an angry American population who
insisted on direct response, the Bush administration capitalized on the fear and ignorance
displayed by its staunchest supporters and chose a compellence strategy through the
mobilization of military force. Bush’s assertion that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons
of mass destruction created the main driving force for the justification of invading Iraq as
a defensive strategy against terrorism, costing billions of dollars and increasing U.S.
presence in the region which was already destabilized by sectarian conflict and
corruption. Further, the War in Iraq exacerbated recruitment as a potent global
recruitment pretext (dramatically raising the risk of future attacks against the West),
created a vacuum in which ISIS could have a foothold and increased the necessity of
focused counterterrorism strategy for the years following until today. Indeed, the War in
Iraq has shaped the prospect of our contemporary understanding of terrorism and is
undeniably linked to counterterrorism strategies, as it was a failed defensive policy and
catalyst to growing terrorism.
There’s little debate among scholars and citizens toward the notion that the Iraq and
Afghanistan invasion was the most controversial and expensive national security policy
in the aftermath of 9/11. The War on Terror was a defensive military campaign to invade
Iraq and Afghanistan launched by the Bush administration in response to 9/11. The Bush
administration marketed the war as a defensive strategy against al Qaeda and terrorists,
by claiming that toppling Saddam’s regime and destroying his weapons of mass
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destruction would administer justice for the attacks while curbing any future threat of
violence.
According to the FY2018 budget, the total cost of the war added a little over $2
trillion to the national debt, with $1,774 trillion spent by the Bush administration and
$807 billion incurred by the Obama administration. Aside from the financial toll, the
human cost was equally astronomical. Since the U.S. went to war in Afghanistan in 2001
and Iraq in 2003, about 2.5 million members of the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force,
Coast Guard and related Reserve and National Guard units have been deployed in the
Afghanistan and Iraq wars. 9500 British troops were sent to Afghanistan. Of those, more
than a third were deployed more than once. As a result, 4,488 U.S. soldiers were killed
and 32,226 more were wounded. 56
In a seemingly endless war, as of 2017, nearly 37,000 Americans had been deployed
more than five times, among them 10,000 members of guard or Reserve units.
Additionally, records also show that 400,000 service members have done three or more
deployments.57 Adding to the financial toll, the human toll was tremendous. Over a
million civilian casualties were reported as of 2015, a number believed to be realistically
much higher.58 The deadly War on Terror fueled an insurmountable national debt, human
loss, a surge in homeless and mentally ill veterans, and incited further radicalization
within the region.
The normalization of the War on Terror was a crucial component to framing it as a
justifiable policy response to 9/11. Ty Solomon argues that there was just as much
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concern for how the war was perceived to the American people and to the world as the
war itself 59. One of the most controversial elements of the war was the absence of visible
ties between Iraq and the 9/11 attacks. Egyptian, Saudi, Emirati and Lebanese hijackers
carried out the attack formulated by a Saudi mastermind linked to an Afghan based
extremist group. In contrast, selling the Iraq war to the American population proved to be
less difficult than anticipated. Solomon links studies which showed that the high levels of
public support for the war was due to the Bush administration’s linking of Iraq to the War
on Terror. He argues the subtle and rhetorical moves that bonded Iraq to the War on
Terror were key in garnering public support. Bush’s convincing use of rhetoric mixed
with high emotions after the attack and Saddam Hussein’s long-standing antagonistic
relationship with the United States meant that most Americans were willing to assume
Iraq’s complicity in the 9/11 attacks.60 Additionally, a black-and-white understanding of
international politics concurrent with the stigmatization of the Muslim community
blurred the distinction between Iraq and al Qaeda.
The Bush administration successfully reproduced U.S. identity by frequently
referring to the attacks as an attack on American “freedom”. The frequent invocation of
“freedom” after 9/11 served the purpose of simplifying American values while linking
“terrorists” and “terrorism” as the antithesis to these values61. As these words were
continually used in a binary spectrum, public interpretation was one that terrorism is a
problem of the sort that must be addressed by a “war”. 62 Solomon states that the terms
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“terrorist”, “outlaw regimes” and “terror states” were frequently found in the same
sentence in late 2002 and early 2003 and used congruent with “weapons of mass
destruction”. For the American people, the othering was distinct, as the administration
drove home the notion that foreign actors practicing a foreign faith in a foreign land
posed as a violent and uncompromising threat to the United States. The stage of good
versus bad was clearly solidified, as a powerful nation was pressured to take immediate
action.
After the attacks, the linkage between terrorists and state sponsors of terrorism was a
decisive move by Bush administration officials to justify the war, and was further
repeated by major elites, pundits, institutions and media who condensed many of the
elements of what “terrorists” and “regime” meant.63 The inclusion and linkage of these
terms was made much more explicitly and frequently after the ‘axis of evil’ State of the
Union speech in late January 2002.64 Just as “freedom” was under attack from terrorists,
such was repeated as being threatened by Saddam Hussein and Iraq.65
Though Byman and Pollock’s research is from 2008, they make starkly accurate
predictions of the vulnerability of further radicalization in Iraq should the U.S. withdraw
troops. They believe one of the biggest mistakes of the Iraq War was that the United
States diverted its military might to Iraq rather than consolidating its victory in
Afghanistan and increasing its chances of hunting down Osama bin Laden.66 They state
that Iraq has indeed become a “central front” in the war on terrorism – largely because of
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the Bush administration’s policies, which have created a Salafi terrorist problem in Iraq
where none existed. The authors warned that, the problem of terrorism emanating from
Iraq will not go away if the United States abandons the country to strife, the arguable
result of withdrawal from the region which opened the door for ISIS to rise among the
destabilization.
Since the U.S. occupation of Iraq began in 2003, foreign-born Salafi extremists have
flocked to Iraq, making it the new center of their “jihad” by attracting the local displaced
population and taking advantage of existing sectarian conflict. Unfortunately, the authors
were correct in predicting that this may be one of the most lasting effects of the U.S.
invasion and occupation: the emergence of a domestic extremist movement in Iraq where
none existed before.67 Byman and Pollock are correct in assessing that the U.S. war in
and occupation of Iraq had benefited the al Qaeda movement in many ways, including
providing a valuable recruiting tool among surviving civilians whose lives, homes, and
families were taken during the war. Further, a study by Peter Bergen and Paul
Cruickshank concluded that the Iraq War has generated a stunning increase in the yearly
rate of fatal jihadist attacks, amounting to hundreds of additional terrorist attacks and
thousands of civilian lives lost—a figure which includes an increase in attacks in Iraq
itself, as well as the rest of the world.68
Not surprisingly, Iraq became the center of al Qaeda’s fund-raising and recruitment
efforts. Because of the war, fighting the United States was a tremendously popular notion
among radical and even mainstream Islamist circles and proof of bin Laden’s “far
enemy” theory: that for Muslims, the offenses of their own governments are
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overshadowed by the actions of Western nations. Byman and Pollock state that even
Muslim scholars and leaders who were originally critical of al Qaeda’s mission began to
vocalize the struggle in Iraq as a legitimate defensive jihad, even in countries that are
close allies of the United States. Indeed, for extremists, the War on Terror became a
palpable example of the West’s war with Islam.
The authors believe the United States occupation in Iraq fostered a new brand of
jihad, providing a place where new and curious Salafi insurgents gain hands on combat
experience and network with other extremists whose allyship they can count on even if
they leave Iraq.69 Most worrisome, Iraq became a new “field of jihad,” a place where
extremists come to meet, train, fight, and create bonds that last when they leave Iraq for
the West or for other countries in the region.70 The region itself proved a solid base for
recruiting, providing real time combat experience along with a vulnerable and displaced
population. The authors argued that beyond military actions, the United States must work
hard to increase the governmental capacity of neighboring states – an action which failed
when President Obama withdrew troops leaving behind prime recruits for extremism in a
new generation of young displaced men and an overwhelming flow of uprooted
refugees.71 Ultimately, the war in Iraq vindicated Osama bin Laden’s main argument that
the primary enemy of the Muslim world was not the local autocrats but the “far enemy”
of the West and particularly the United States.
Similarly, Jonathan Gilmore makes the strong assessment that the movement towards
counterinsurgency is inappropriate as a platform for the protection of human security and
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unlikely to be successful as a long-term strategy to address the underlying social and
political problems that contribute to the violence in Iraq and Afghanistan. He argues that
the War on Terror’s method of counterinsurgency functions as an instrument directed
towards victory against a terrorist insurgency rather than as an end, and does nothing to
bolster or repair existing tensions between the United States and Muslim led nations.72
Gilmore maintains that motivations for insurgents and combatants is not monolithic,
as motives for participation in violence in a conflict-affected society are likely to vary
considerably and may be influenced by a variety of ideological, local political, economic
and personal agendas.73 He states that a more empirically grounded analysis would have
provided some response to criticisms of Western interpretations of Afghanistan and the
notion that the Taliban are “one-dimensional zealots, imprisoned within their culture of
extremism and tribal honor”.74 As a result, the scope of the research is limited only to that
which is useful in justifying U.S. forces in a War on Terror campaign. Gilmore accurately
states, “the implicit acceptance and the relative stability of the War on Terror narrative
reflect its central importance in providing a justification to the U.S. electorate for longterm and hazardous overseas military deployments where U.S. security interests may not
be immediately evident”. 75
Under the guise of toppling Saddam’s regime and “introducing democracy” through
state-building, the Iraq occupation succeeded in the disempowerment of local
populations, dependency on international interveners, and a compromised sense of self-
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determination and state sovereignty—all factors which make the region ripe for
radicalization. 76 Gilmore suggests people-centered approaches, which are focused on
community building and diplomacy. He states while the U.S. counterinsurgency concept
stresses the need for local legitimacy and the introduction of Western society, the
inhabitants of the societies subjected to counterinsurgency programs like in Iraq and
Afghanistan remain disempowered and have no opportunity to contest the War on Terror
narrative within which it operates. War creates a vulnerable population, particularly in
Iraq, which was already reeling from decades of autocratic rule on top of existing tribal
conflict. Gilmore argues that community based programs aimed at facilitating post war
reconstruction, the development of cultural understanding and empowerment of local
populations are not conducted as ends in themselves, but rather only employed in the
service of U.S. security interests.77
Further, the narrative surrounding the purpose of the invasion is crucial, as the
elements set forth by the Bush administration normalized Western presence and dictated
military motivation. Gilmore argues that cultural knowledge obtained by U.S. forces
remained conditioned by the overarching War on Terror narrative put forth by the
administration and encouraged by the American population. He claims sociocultural
knowledge is only obtained to support preordained War on Terror strategic objectives
rather than to potentially challenge the premises upon which campaigns are conducted—
an accurate notion when examining the lack of community building post withdrawal. 78
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Scholar Joseba Zulaika attests that since the United States believed future nuclear
attacks by terrorists were only a matter of time, they justified waging a war preemptively, even in a nuclear context, thus breaking the historic assumption that nuclear
arsenals were for deterrence, not for actual usage. What justifies the use of a “just war” in
the nuclear era is the desire of terrorists for having the weapons of mass destruction the
U.S. claims they possess. There is nothing evil or irrational about having or using them,
as it is an established fact that terrorists desire them and one day will have them. Thus,
the formula of “not if, but when” becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The counterterrorist
thinking makes it an imperative that the war must start now – against Saddam Hussein,
against al Qaeda and against all potential terrorists. This is how the American public,
including the liberal media, accepted the rationale to go to war against Iraq.79
Despite a declared interest in local engagement during the War on Terror, the
objectives sought by U.S. in Iraq centered on the maintenance of Iraq as a compliant
government and the reconstruction of the state as a minimally democratic ally in
combatting terrorism.80 Gilmore argues a general concern for the well-being of the local
Iraqi and Afghan populations, less military security focus and distinctive development
have a more positive effect toward human security and combatting radicalization.81
Unfortunately, these principles were not heavily considered during the Iraq occupation
and subsequent withdrawal of troops, solidifying jihadi justification for more violence
and creating a vacuum in which they could successfully continue to operate.
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In using the war as a method of defense, the United States paid its own price in the
form of a massive debt, disabled veterans, and fodder for radicalization. The occupation
of Iraq and Afghanistan in direct response to the attacks was normalized by the Bush
administration and unquestioned by the American public who so desperately supported
the administering of justice in the wake of the largest attack in history— even if justice
was directed inaccurately. The cost incurred, civilian damage inflicted, veteran trauma
aroused, and destabilization of the occupied region placed a heavy toll on both sides and
proved counterintuitive as a counterinsurgency strategy because it provided solid base for
further radicalization and continued violence. The initial War on Terror failed in its
mission to apprehend Osama bin Laden (an operation which was successfully completed
by President Obama in the later part of the war) and destroy al Qaeda, instead fueling the
ideology of extremism and exacerbating the binary between American “freedom” and
values and jihadist perceived “War on Islam”. By turning the war on terrorism into a
conflict of “us” versus “them”, the Bush administration made it hard to bridge the gap
between domestic and foreign audiences for many years to come.82

Ham, P. V. (2003). War, Lies, and Videotape: Public Diplomacy and the USA’s War on Terrorism. Security Dialogue, 34(4), Page
438.
82

36

Chapter 4: Torture, Excessive Force and “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques”
In December of 2014, the Senate Intelligence Committee released 525 pages of a
6,000-page report detailing the use of torture during CIA detention and interrogation on
captured combatants and suspected extremists after 9/11. Though the remaining pages are
still classified, the report details actions by CIA officials including torturing prisoners
using what they dubbed as “enhanced interrogation techniques”, providing misleading or
false information to the media, impeding government oversight and internal criticism,
and mishandling the program. Additionally, the report revealed the existence of
previously unknown detainees, the severity of the treatment that detainees were subjected
to, and that more methods of torture were used than previously disclosed. The report
concluded that torturing prisoners did not help acquire actionable intelligence or gain
cooperation from detainees and that the program damaged the United States' international
standing.83
Torture has a complicated history in the international realm. The UN Declaration
of Human Rights gave way to the Convention against Torture, which offered a more
narrow scope on addressing the issue. Article 1.1 of the Convention describes torture as:
“any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing
him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity” 84

Torture is prohibited and it does not recognize any excuse of states to use it in emergency
situations. Even a single act of torture is prohibited by international law under any
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circumstances. The prohibition also extends to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment, as the Convention distinguishes between torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment on a variety of bases.
Manfred Nowak details the essential elements of torture are the following:
involvement of a public official, infliction of severe pain or suffering, intention of the
perpetrator and a specific purpose, and powerlessness of the victim. Infliction of severe
pain or suffering is a requirement for both torture and cruel or inhuman treatment and
punishment.85 If a treatment inflicts severe pain or suffering, it qualifies as cruel or
inhuman treatment and, if the additional requirements of powerlessness of the victim,
intent and purpose are fulfilled, also as torture.86 Nowak emphasizes the intent of the act
within the definition of torture by stating the threshold of torture is only reached if such
conditions are deliberately inflicted on a particular group of detainees for the purpose of
punishment.87
While a huge justification for the use of torture is that it is a successful deterrent
for future violence, as a deterrent method torture doesn’t work. Given that the purpose of
a deterrent is to prevent, torture is an act which takes place in retaliation to a violent act.
Once torture is in use, it has failed as a proper deterrent method because the action had
occurred despite the threat of torture. That said, torture can still act as a deterrent by fear,
albeit not a very good one. On the one hand, the use of torture is meant to punish
perpetrators convicted of violent crimes, and on the other hand its use is intended as a
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warning to quell future violence. Additionally, governments justify their use of torture as
a means to extract information, though several studies show information gathered under
torture is unreliable. States torture combatants when they believe that those tortured will
release secrets, which might aid the state in its attempts to identify and eliminate
domestic threats. Further, states engage in torture as a form of punishment. Finally, states
engage in torture to instill terror in the surrounding population.88
Still, torture studies present several complications. Torture itself is difficult to
quantify as scholars and civilians do not have access to intelligence that is provided
during interrogations and are dependent upon what is conveyed by governmental
institutions. Although torture is practiced in nearly all counterinsurgency campaigns, the
evidence properly documenting torture’s effects is severely limited and inaccessible to
scholars. Regardless, the theoretical arguments contend that torture is ineffective for
reducing killings perpetrated by insurgents because it both fails to reduce insurgent
capacities for violence and because it can increase the incentives for insurgents to commit
future killings by creating a hostile environment.89
Though much of the CIA report remains unknown, the public is aware that
"enhanced interrogation techniques" were administered on detainees by various
components of the U.S. Armed Forces at black sites around the world,
including Bagram, Guantanamo Bay, and Abu Ghraib by individuals authorized by
officials of the George W. Bush administration. Some methods used included beating,
stress positions, sleep deprivation, sexual abuse, and waterboarding to name a select few.
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The CIA only admitted to waterboarding Abu Zubaydah, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
and Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri.90
Jamal Barnes accurately proclaims that after 9/11, the United States created a protorture culture that promoted an “us vs. them” mentality between the United States and
terrorist groups and operatives, removed Geneva protections from terrorist suspects and
re-defined torture and what was a justified use of force. The desire for immediate justice
in the aftermath of the attacks opened the door to arguments for the use of torture to a
point where torture has become an accepted practice within the United States.91 By redefining torture practices as “enhanced interrogation”, the Bush administration redefined
the acceptance of pain and suffering with unnecessary violence. The new definition
removed the negative connotations associated with torture and brought it within
“civilized” and “necessary” conduct to be relinquished on a foreign enemy who was a
direct threat to American values.92 Further, Barnes proclaims that the Bush administration
cleverly dubbed its torture practices as “enhanced interrogation” because the United
States knew it could not openly challenge the torture taboo in the international
community and employ torture to fight terrorism. Challenging this torture taboo would
have challenged the U.S. identity as a “humane” state and de-legitimized American
values while spawning further material for extremist recruitment. 93
No military base exhibited the horror and inefficacy of torture quite like Abu
Ghraib. In late 2003, a whistleblower submitted photos to the press confirming what
human rights organizations suspected— that Iraqi detainees were being tortured and
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abused by American soldiers under the justification of national security. Unfortunately,
the Abu Ghraib photographs did not expose a few “bad apples”, or an exceptional
instance of brutality or perversity, but instead the dehumanization of a desperate
administration with power in its disposal.94 Avery Gordon accurately proclaims that the
actions and policies of military prison guards reflect accepted civilian prison norms.
Excessive force, civil disability and the loss of internationally guaranteed rights, and
indefinite detention are central means by which the War on Terror are executed and
normalized among Americans who believe freedom is being preserved by these actions. 95
General Antonio Taguba who investigated Abu Ghraib found that numerous
incidents of sadistic criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees. The graphic
photographic evidence amounted to well over one thousand images and nearly one
hundred video files of detainee abuse. Taguba stated that the systemic and illegal abuse
of detainees was intentionally perpetrated with the specific purpose to cause harm.96
Indeed as more detainees were admitted into both Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, and no
information continued to be provided, the swelling population had produced a frustrating
lack of actionable intelligence. High-value or low-value, the tortured detainees yielded
embarrassingly little—even with the assumption that the system was capable of
distinguishing between them.97
Aside from the physical effects of enhanced interrogations, techniques for “breaking”
prisoners are different from standard forms of interrogation, most notably due to its focus
on psychological pain. Furthermore, the infliction of injuries would be difficult to detect
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since the scars remain deep inside the psyche and inadmissible for blame.98 As officials
were aware that those who participate in the use of such techniques could face criminal
sanctions, key procedures were further refined to leave no marks (such as
waterboarding).99
Gordon believes that while Abu Ghraib shows abundant cause for moral outrage
and disgust, there is no warrant for being surprised or shocked that military personnel of
the United States tortured, abused and ritually humiliated other human beings and that the
country’s political and military leaders covered up their authorization of it.100 The
normality of the abuse exhibited by the administration trickled down to the American
population, as everyday citizens believed this level of force was necessary to keep
innocent people safe and protect democracy. This assumed normality also explains why,
when interviewed by the FBI, no one reported observing any misconduct or mistreatment
of those detained at Abu Ghraib.101 It is no shock that no member of, or contractor to, the
U.S. Department of Defense in Iraq, Cuba, Afghanistan or elsewhere has been charged
with torture, inflicting cruel and unusual punishment or war crimes. The lesser order of
charges against the lowest ranking officials were crumbs thrown to an angry press and
agitated public.102
Author Christopher Sullivan believes that justifications for torture do not rest on the
reliability of the information provided, but on arguments that engaging in torture will
allow state agents to somehow reduce insurgent perpetrated violence. Neither outcome
was presented in the post 9/11 period with the use of torture. Like the abuse, the pressure
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was systemic, starting at the top and trickling all the way down. With the passage of time
the demand for proof was overtaken by the demand for results.103 The information
provided by tortured detainees as part of post 9/11 CIA torture programs failed to provide
valuable information regarding those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, and preventing
future violence. Still, rather than questioning whether those detainees were terrorists and
perhaps instead innocent persons, military officials toughened coercive interrogation
tactics along with other aspects of the conditions of confinement. The notion that the
interrogation techniques didn’t work or that the detainees were not active insurgents was
never considered.104 In short, the agony of torture created an incentive to speak, but not
necessarily to speak the truth.105
Jose Alvarez details a disturbing loophole in the Torture Convention employed by
the Bush administration under the asserted excuse of self-defense and necessity in war
time.106 Alvarez states that in a government issued memoranda, the Bush administration
concluded that the relevant obligations on interrogation techniques in the third and fourth
Geneva Conventions do not apply to al Qaeda or Taliban detainees or to "unlawful
combatants" generally, claiming they did not fall under traditional “POW” status.107 The
Torture Convention's constitutional constraints were said not to apply to aliens outside
the United States, according to the memo writers. The Convention does nothing to avert
torture when the U.S. acts against aliens abroad.108 Further, Alvarez claims the
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administration justified away a great deal of heinous acts after 9/11 because they were not
narrowly defined as "torture”.109 Finally, the torture memo asserts that international law
does not bind the U.S. military because it is not federal law, while President Bush’s
determination of the detention of Al Qaeda and Taliban members overrides any
customary international law.110
There are substantial reasons to doubt the effectiveness of enhanced interrogation.
Further, it is worth nothing that excessive force and torture tactics have been condemned
by psychologists commissioned by the Intelligence Science Board, who reported that the
harsh techniques were “outmoded, amateurish and unreliable”. In 2008, the Senate
Armed Services Committee released a report explicitly rejecting the Bush
administration’s contention that tough interrogation methods were successful in keeping
the country and its troops safe. The report stated that those harsh methods damaged the
U.S. government’s ability to collect accurate intelligence, strengthened the hand of
extremists, and compromised U.S. moral authority.111 Increasingly apparent was the
notion that many individuals detained in Iraq and Afghanistan by the U.S. government
had no connection to terrorism, often sold for bounties and poorly assessed by military
intelligence who had little knowledge of the region and its actors.112
To date, eight people in U.S. custody have been tortured to death.113 An estimated
24,000 interrogations have taken place at Guantanamo, a figure believed to be much
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higher.114 The extent of prisoner abuse after 9/11 indicates forms of expressive
punishment and scapegoating. Consequently, the exposure of torture at U.S. military
bases provided valuable recruiting material for extremists and fueled further vitriol
toward the West, with some former detainees emphatically radicalizing where they hadn’t
before. Indeed, as Gordon states, the reality of the “foreign” enemy captured, tortured,
ritually humiliated, detained indefinitely reproduced the death of law and morality to be
presented as the necessary price for Western safety and security.115
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Chapter 5: Targeted Drone Attacks
One of the most prominent features of the Obama administration’s approach to
defeating international terrorism was his use of targeted drone attacks— particularly in
Pakistan, where bin Laden was ultimately killed. Heavily popularized due to its ease,
pilotless drones flying at 10,000 feet and operated by CIA agents 7,500 miles away in the
Nevada desert perfected the strategy of warfare at a distance.116 In 2012, the United
States military had more than 7,000 drones with an additional 12,000 more on the
ground. In 2011, these drones carried out hundreds of strikes in six countries,
transforming the way our democracy deliberates and engages in what we used to think of
as war.117
The strength of the robotic weaponry of drone attacks lies in their ability to see
and think outside the realm of human functions. The drones can program a destination
and fly by themselves; they can follow a target for days from the invisible altitude, while
the faraway operator is never in danger of being killed from below. Unmanned machines
such as drones do not have desires of their own, intentions, or feel subjectively
responsible for their actions. As machines they cannot commit war crimes, as the
required intent to commit them is missing. The killing itself might perhaps now be done
in a subjectless manner by machines finding out who the terrorists are and acting on their
own.118
Further, drones can be used for any battlefield operation: surveillance,
reconnaissance, precision attacks, targeted killings, etc. As any other robot, a drone can
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be used to carry out dull, dirty or dangerous battlefield operations, nor do they suffer
from human weakness. Similarly, drones can continue flying longer than a human
pilot.119 Economy of resources is also critical because drone costs 4.5 million dollars and
it is 30 times cheaper than a jet fighter and there are no human costs even in case of
failure of a mission, if any. The frightening level of detachment involved in a weapon
designed to target and kill became a central force in Obama’s efforts in destabilizing al
Qaeda and ISIS, and capturing Osama bin Laden. However, this was not without
consequence.
It is hard to know how many people have been killed by drones (some estimates
include between 2,000 and 3,000), let alone how many of them are civilians, as each side
paints a different picture of the number of casualties. Some Western estimates put the
number of militants among the dead at 85%. In contrast, Pakistani newspapers calculated
that of the 708 people killed in 2009, only five were known militants. Another newspaper
in Pakistan, The News, estimated that of the 701 people killed by drones between January
2006 and April 2009, only 14 were known militants. Unfortunately, the area is sealed by
Pakistan, with the CIA and Pakistani secret services being the main sources of
intelligence and holding on to this information. Of the people killed, the CIA knows the
names of only 125 people and considers a meager 35 of them as high value targets. Given
this discrepancy, it is not surprising therefore that reliable information is extremely hard
to get, as American and Pakistani official sources issue wildly divergent claims.120
Counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen told Congress in April 2009 that in 3
years of drone strikes in Pakistan, Americans killed 14 senior al Qaeda leaders; while in
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the same period drones killed 700 Pakistani civilians in the same area. He stressed that
the drone strikes are highly unpopular and are deeply aggravating to the population,
giving rise to a feeling of anger that coalesces the population around the extremists and
leads to spikes of extremist activity. Kilcullen observed that the ratio of civilians killed
for each militant is 50:1, that is, 98% of drone casualties are civilians— despite the
United States’ insistence that drone attacks create technological precision. Kilcullen
claimed, “Every one of these dead non-combatants [creates] an alienated family, a new
desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement that has grown
exponentially even as drone strikes have increased.” He stressed his main concern with
the formation of “the accidental guerrilla” – ordinary people caught in the fight who end
up supporting the local fight against the outsiders and who would be impossible to
distinguish from the terrorists, except by accident.121
Given the fact that drone strikes have targeted weddings and funerals and appear
to be seriously fuelling the insurgency, it is no surprise that Taliban recruits increased as
a result. Airstrikes are prominent in motivating suicide attacks, a UN report concluded;
while surveys show direct links between family members killed and joining or supporting
the insurgency. One concrete instance of such links was provided by Faisal Shahzad, the
Pakistani-American known for the failed bomb in Times Square in May 2010, who
declared in his trial that he was avenging the civilians in the drone attacks. Zulaika
concludes that the drone war in Afghanistan and Pakistan is losing the fight against and
increasing the threat of terrorism, and making further terror attacks on America more
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likely, not less.122 In general, studies show that military force has rarely ended terrorists
groups in comparison with law enforcement approaches and political processes.123
Similarly, Akbar Nasir Khan believes the tactical move of using drones was
counterproductive and unwittingly helping terrorists in their recruitment process which
resulted in the continuance of the cycle of violence.124 Khan states that in the post 9/11
period, drone justification was based upon the premise that failed or near failed states,
allegedly like Pakistan, did not have the capacity or willingness to deal with terrorists
who are a threat to the U.S. interests, its people and soldiers. Further, this incompetency
of such states confers more authority on the U.S. to take necessary steps, like drone
attacks to neutralize these threats. The U.S. has been using drones to target suspected
terrorists in Pakistan since 2004, with a sharp upsurge during Obama’s presidency.
Journalist David Ignatius cites an anonymous U.S. official who claims there were 55
Predator drone strikes in 2010 in the Pakistani tribal regions— nearly double the peak
level during the Bush years, which reached the mid-30s in 2008. There are different
claims and counterclaims about the number of strikes and body counts, though the
consensus is that civilians were killed at an exponentially larger rate than combatants.125
Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann of American Foundation compiled a
report named “The Year of the Drone” in which they studied 114 drone raids in which
more than 1,200 people were killed. Of those, between 549 and 849 were reliably
reported to be militant fighters, while the rest were civilians. The true civilian fatality rate
since 2004 according to the Foundation’s analysis is approximately 32 percent. Pakistani
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authorities claim something different, that for each al Qaeda and Taliban terrorist killed
by U.S. drones, 140 innocent Pakistanis also had to die. They claim over 90 percent of
those killed in the deadly missile strikes were civilians.126
While the accurate accounts of civilian deaths by drones in Pakistan differentiate,
little can be argued against the notion that the death of innocent people gives the victim’s
family strong reason to join the Taliban rather than working against them. Journalist
Rahimullah Yusufzai says, “Drone attacks are radicalizing other people who may not
have supported the Taliban”. The Taliban leaders have used the unpopularity of the drone
attacks and stated that suicide bombings in Pakistan are a reaction to drone attacks in
Pakistan, citing a direct link between drone attacks and extremist violence. This is not
unfounded, as every one of the dead non-combatants represents an alienated family, a
new revenge feud, and more recruits for a militant movement.127 Still, many facts about
the use of drones are classified, so it is difficult to get a full and accurate picture.
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Chapter 6: Public Diplomacy and the American Brand
Although no negotiation between the U.S. and any members of al Qaeda took
place after 9/11 in the traditional sense of direct contact, the U.S. utilized its soft power
following the attacks to negotiate its public image. The use of public diplomacy was the
closest to negotiation that was allowable to take place. Al Qaeda’s remote location, the
elusiveness of Osama bin Laden’s whereabouts, and the detraction of U.S. credibility
through the Iraq and Afghanistan invasion made traditional negotiation to take place.
These factors combined with the U.S. tradition of refusing to negotiate with terrorists
created a circumstance in which the use of soft power and public diplomacy was the
closest to traditional negotiation that was possible.
Traditionally, the concept of public diplomacy and soft power are not generally
considered to be legitimate counterterrorism strategies. Public opinion almost always
equates defeating terrorism with the use of direct and brutal force. Soft power is not an
often-explored option because it involves more community based efforts and does not
yield immediate results. In fact, while utilizing public diplomacy and soft power to defeat
an ideology has longer lasting benefits, it can often take generations before these benefits
come to fruition. A counterterrorism campaign that embraces soft power approaches that
include a genuine commitment to rehabilitation, de-radicalization, counter-radicalization
and welfare and community based services is likely to achieve better results than sole
reliance on brute force.128 Truthfully, soft power is a long-term strategy, as it takes time
to derive legitimacy from soft power and it is quicker to lose than hard power. Rather
than a quick surgical operation, the soft power approach to counterterrorism seeks to
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provide humanitarian and developmental initiatives and a counter-narrative to dissuade
potential members from joining terrorist organizations.129
While the founder of soft power theory Joseph Nye acknowledges that non-state
actors such as multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations and terrorist
groups exercise soft power, there is little discussed as to whether the use of soft power
exerted on to a non-state actor is effective.130 However, as previously evidenced, military
force, enhanced interrogation and other brutal measures have an antithesis effect on
countering extremism and in fact assist in exacerbating recruitment. Because the United
States utilized soft power so little in its strategy after 9/11, few empirical studies exist on
its intended effect in countering terrorism. That is not to say that it is not an effective
method, as many studies successfully relate the impact of community services to overall
well-being. The uncompromising use of hard power and the neglect of soft power in
counterterrorism has serious, unpalatable long-term consequences.
Oluwaseun Tella believes that effective strategy for diplomacy in
counterterrorism entails a people centric approach of capacity building, economic
development and an effective counter-narrative to terrorist recruiters’ narratives and
ideologies. It also involves a concerted effort to provide public education including
mobilizing leaders and religious organizations to challenge the ideology and violence
perpetuated by terrorist recruiters and providing counseling for vulnerable populations.131
Tella continues that soft power employed as counterterrorism entails two critical issues.
The first is identifying and deploying significant individuals within the state to dampen
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the terrorist ideology, while the second is employing a multilateral diplomacy by drawing
on the assistance of other states to tackle terrorist acts. For example, the importance of
counter-narratives by religious leaders and other eminent personalities or groups to
undermine terrorist activities is crucial to dispelling myths of religious justification for
violence that is encouraged by recruiters. The second strategy is relevant given that in the
wake of the September 11th attacks, Bush’s nationalistic unilateral policies regarding the
war in Iraq did not employ the cooperation of other states in its War on Terror.132 Bush’s
over-reliance on hard power had a significantly negative impact on the U.S. economy and
on its soft power. This is most evident in increasingly negative global perceptions of the
U.S. and its legitimacy in the wake of the 2003 war in Iraq.
In the period after 9/11, the U.S. was not only fighting a war on international
terrorism by classical, military means but was also engaged in efforts to win the moral
and political support of the Muslim world. After 9/11, the U.S. government actively
neglected cultural diplomacy that involved cooperation with Muslim communities and
solidifying relations. The attacks were not so much a confrontation with U.S. capabilities
as it was the identity of the U.S. as a superpower. Instead of fostering communication and
pacification between the U.S. and Muslim communities both domestic and international,
much of post 9/11 public diplomacy policy entailed a rebranding of the United States.
Peter Van Ham claims that the Bush administration put forth a group of initiatives aimed
at rebranding the U.S. as anything but a bully to touch ordinary citizens of Muslim
countries. Since public diplomacy often involves intercultural communication, new
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marketing, PR and branding methods were used to communicate and adapt the USA’s
political message to reflect the cultural sensitivities of foreign audiences.133
Van Ham believes that unfortunately, the Bush administration used public
diplomacy as a reason to extend the notion of western supremacy and salvaging U.S.
reputation rather than to engage in democratic, non-coercive communications with the
Muslim world.134 Van Ham continues that the events of 9/11 triggered renewed efforts to
market the brand of the U.S. and its policies while the rhetoric of war and American
values served to help American society justify brutal force overseas. Ad campaigns
showed U.S. citizens of different races and religions (including many Muslims)
expressing their patriotism to reposition and recharge the American brand, both at home
and abroad.135 Further, Washington used the wave of post 9/11 patriotism to push through
its international agenda, starting with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and continued
pressures for ‘regime change’ in the wider Middle East.
Van Ham argues that 9/11 – which became a successful global brand in its own right
– was used to dominate political discourse and to discipline potential critics in the U.S.
and overseas. For the Bush administration, the temptation was overwhelming to use
public diplomacy as a soft power tool for controlling and dominating political discourse,
both at home and abroad.136 . This is not only reflected in U.S. public diplomacy but also
in the plans of the Bush administration to democratize the wider Middle East. This
concept was based on the optimistic assumption that once the Iraqi people were freed
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from the yoke of the Saddam Hussein, U.S. military forces would be greeted as liberators,
after which stability will dawn upon the region. Van Ham argues that it remains doubtful
that it will take mere regime change in Baghdad to achieve a stable and democratic – let
alone Western-oriented – Iraq.137
Stephen Emerson claims that while the military instrument of power has once again
become the centerpiece of American counterterrorism efforts and provides some
immediate measure of success, the tendency to rely on the military to deal with what are
ultimately complex political and socioeconomic problems has limited utility and is
incredibly short sighted. Indeed, it may provide a false sense of confidence in the ability
of the U.S. to stem the spread of terrorism through the exercise of American military
power. Ultimately this approach to counterterrorism is likely to fail, as was proven during
the Iraq war.138 Emerson boldly suggests that if the United States is to be successful, it
must find a way to address the underlying sources of instability and violent extremism
from the base up and not seek to impose an Americanized version of security. Most
importantly, the U.S. must be willing to pursue a strategy that bridges divergent views of
security and build upon areas of common concern for the benefit of all.139
Although U.S. public diplomacy and soft power is an essential (and still
underdeveloped and undervalued) component of its overall policy towards the Middle
East, it will take more than better communications to address the USA’s credibility and
image problems in that region. Using diplomatic power merely as a tool to increase the
positive image of the U.S. doesn’t work in the long term because it still operates under
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the model of Western supremacy and makes no acknowledgement of its audience. Using
public diplomacy to counter terrorism will do better to work within the Muslim
community at a grassroots level to quell terrorist recruitment and mitigate hostility. The
previous models of using diplomacy haven’t worked because they are still Western
centric and capitalistic and do not focus on commonalities. While public diplomacy and
soft power takes time and the effects may not be seen for generations, they often yield
longer lasting results when community engagement is prioritized. For now, U.S. public
diplomacy aspires to enter a dialogue with the Muslim world, a dialogue that hardly
exists now— particularly in the current climate.
Conclusion
As evidenced, examining the period after the September 11th attacks offers a
unique study in mechanisms for Western response to terrorist attacks. The United States
employed several measures to administer justice, neutralize al Qaeda, and prevent future
attacks. The variety of policies presented in the years following the attacks include
methods of deterrence, compellence, defense, and negotiation. Since the threat of
international terrorism remains at the forefront of American politics today, examining the
success of past methods remains ever imperative.
Given that none of the 9/11 hijackers had Iraqi roots, had no funding from the Iraq
government and no al Qaeda presence or training took place in Iraq, the War on Terror
was doomed for failure at its inception. As a defensive policy, the war in Iraq held no
merit as Iraq held no clear threat to attack the United States. Additionally, the
ramifications of the long-term military presence, the destabilization of the Iraqi
government, and civilian casualties opposed the intended effort of defeating extremism
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by creating a new breeding ground for radicalization and creating opportunity for the
future inception of the Islamic State.140
What’s worse, the destabilization of the region brought about by the toppling of
the Hussein regime, occupation and destruction of Iraq and negligence in creating local
support systems established a vacuum in which the Islamic state would later use to
rebrand extremism and establish key regions in Iraq and nearby Syria for its caliphate
through guerilla warfare.141 The notion presented by the Bush administration of the War
on Terror as a defensive measure was determined unsuccessful given that Iraq was found
to have no links to the 9/11 attacks, the colonial style occupation of Iraq only further
fueled recruitment into terrorist activity, and there was no enemy in the region to
neutralize since al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden had no base in Iraq. Indeed, the failure of
the War on Terror cost a huge financial and social burden on the United States with
ramifications the global community is still experiencing today.
While several studies show torture is an ineffective method for information
retrieval, the U.S. unabashedly employed it as a method of deterrence. As concluded in
the CIA torture report, the use of excessive force on detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Abu
Ghraib, Bagram, and other U.S. bases retrieved no useful intelligence against those
responsible for the attacks, nor revealed imperative information on future attacks, training
cells, or bin Laden’s whereabouts.142 In short, torture as a deterrent is not marred with
success because if torture must be employed then the threat to deter was not effective
from the start. As deterrence is dependent upon preventing the other party from action,
torture is a direct response to action and thus fails at its inception. Additionally, torture is
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generally conducted in desperation and a method of direct action and revenge rather than
for the extraction of reliable information. The nature of torture is built to dehumanize and
break down an enemy and not for a specific policy of success. Further, given that torture
and enhanced interrogation failed to yield evidence that it aided in the suppression of al
Qaeda activities, and that the revelations of the abuse were used in recruitment tools by
extremists, excessive force and torture after 9/11 was a resounding failure.143
Targeted drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan remained the central method
of terrorism strategy during the Obama administration. While, successful compellence
requires displaying to the adversary the will and capability to cause terrible pain if the
adversary does not change its behavior, it is unlikely at first glance that policymakers
would choose to use drone strikes to cause pain to an adversary by deliberately targeting
innocents. In terms of causing pain to the adversary directly, the death or threat of death
to a plotter is an organization’s cost of doing business, not a taste of suffering to come if
it does not change its behavior. Although the appeal of using drones make them seem like
an economically sound choice with least chance of human casualty, the inaccuracy of
these targeted strikes was at an alarmingly high percentage despite all the technological
advancements involved.
Given that exact figures vary on how many civilian casualties were produced per
drone strike, an accurate assessment of their success is up to speculation. However,
accounts detailing casualty numbers as high as 90%144 show a frighteningly
disproportionate rate of civilian to militant deaths. While drone attacks under the
direction of President Obama were indeed successful in eliminating key al Qaeda and
143

Sullivan, C. M. (2014). The (In)effectiveness of Torture for Combating Insurgency. Journal of Peace Research, 51(3), Page 388.
Zulaika, J. (2012). Drones, Witches and Other Flying Objects: The Force of Fantasy in US Counterterrorism. Critical Studies on
Terrorism, 5(1), Page 56.
144

58

ISIS figureheads, the destruction caused to the civilian population and resentment fueled
into radicalization far outweighed the victories of assassinated combatants as many new
ones rose to replace them. The efficacy of drones as a successful measure of
counterterrorism is one that needs further study and I concede that in the compellence
framework it was not successful.
At the beginning of this paper, I intended to argue in favor of public diplomacy
and soft power as a successful method of counterterrorism. Unfortunately, little scholarly
evidence exists to present the U.S. as using traditional diplomacy in the period after 9/11.
Due to the U.S. traditional hard line stance on negotiation with terrorists, soft power and
public diplomacy after 9/11 were the best source for negotiation by proxy, establishing
the best opportunity for the United States to engage with its Muslim American
community in identifying and intervening in extremism. Instead, the Bush administration
felt it more prudent in the period after 9/11 to establish the American brand of “freedom”
and marketing “9/11” as a brand of justification for human rights abuses on its citizens
and abroad.
The negligence in capacity building and cooperation with the Muslim American
community and prioritization in the preservation of the American exceptionalism did
little to nothing in countering violent extremism and remains a heavily underutilized and
undervalued concept still today. While there is no evidence to show that this diplomacy
through marketing and propaganda of the American brand was used in recruitment, there
is no evidence to conclude that it was successful in defeating existing combatants either.
Under the guise of combating terrorism, U.S. counterterrorism considers itself
legitimized to overrule national sovereignties and flaunt international law; in short, to
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establish a state of exception by which actions that ordinarily are illegal and immoral are
suddenly tolerable because the fight against the terrorist demands it. Perhaps it is the very
nature of the term itself that lends to complications in policy. For example, in examining
the state of violence within U.S. borders, an overwhelming number of casualties of
American citizens is through gun violence at the hands of white supremacists. Deaths by
shootings far outweigh deaths by individuals and groups who hold radical Islamist
beliefs. The expansion of the concept of what a terrorist looks like and believes in would
truly transform the framework with which we view terrorism today.
As unfortunate as the lack of engagement with the Muslim American community
after 9/11 is, it is never too late to employ this method of diplomacy. Allying with the
community rather than alienating it has far greater effect, especially considering most
plots are foiled through family members reporting loved ones rather than sting
operations. Unfortunately, given the history of counterterrorism policy as dictated by
xenophobic and colonial aspirations, this shows no sign of being prioritized within the
near future— particularly as President Trump’s Muslim ban continues to be proposed and
supported by a frightened and misled fan base and imperious administration. Similarly,
the United Kingdom’s role in assisting the U.S. in the post 9/11 period has little research
available— a perspective which would be helpful in terrorism studies. However, until the
U.S. is willing to work in engaging its Muslim, immigrant, and refugee population,
counterterrorism is doomed to act as a self-fulfilling prophecy by continually creating an
enemy to defeat said enemy as justification for subjugating oppressed civilian
populations to violence and control for Western hegemony.
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